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QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1. WHETHER THE COURT OP APPEALS ERRED IN
REVERSING THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT GRANTED BY THE
TRIAL COURT IN HOLDING THAT AN ISSUE OF FACT
EXISTS AS TO THE RIGHTS OF THE RESPONDENTS AS
GUARANTORS TO SUBROGATION TO THE COLLATERAL
GIVEN AS SECURITY TO THE PETITIONER, VALLEY
BANK AND TRUST COMPANY.
2. WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED AS
A MATTER OF LAW IN APPLYING PROVISIONS OF THE
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE TO THE GUARANTY
AGREEMENT OF THE PETITIONER, VALLEY BANK AND
TRUST COMPANY.
OPINION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
The opinion of the Court of Appeals is contained at 64
Utah Adv. Rep. 66, a copy of which is attached as Exhibit "A," in
the appendix to this brief.
JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
The jurisdiction of this court to review a decision of
the Court of Appeals under a petition for a writ of certiorari is
conferred under Rule 42, R. Utah S. Ct., and under Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-2-2(5) (1986).

The date of the entry of the decision of the

Court of Appeals is September 1, 1987.

STATUTES, ORDINANCES, ROLES, REGULATION, ETC,
Utah Code Ann, § 70A-3-102(l)(e)(1965)
(1) In this chapter unless the context
otherwise requires . . .
(e) "Instrument" means a negotiable
instrument.
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-3-606(l)(1965) Impairment
of recourse or of collateral.
(T) The holder discharges any party to
the instrument to the extent that without such
party's consent the holder
(a) without express reservation of rights
releases or agrees not to sue any person
against whom the party has to the knowledge of
the holder a right of recourse or agrees to
suspend the right to enforce against such person
the instrument or collateral or otherwise
discharges such person, except that failure or
delay in effecting any required presentment,
protest or notice of dishonor with respect to
any such person does not discharge any party as
to whom presentment, protest or notice of
dishonor is effective or unnecessary; or
(b) unjustifiably impairs any collateral
for the instrument given by or on behalf of the
party or any person against whom he has a right
of recourse, (emphasis added)
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(5)(1986)
(5) The Supreme Court has sole discretion
in granting or denying a petition for writ of
certiorari for the review of a Court of Appeals
adjudication, but the Supreme Court shall
review those cases certified to it by the Court
of Appeals under Subsection (3)(b).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Petitioner, Valley Bank and Trust Company ("Valley
Bank" hereafter), appeals from the decision of the Court of
Appeals (See Exhibit "A" in Appendix) which reverses and remands
the granting of summary judgment by the trial court as to the
liability of the Respondents, Peter Lowe, Jr. and Richard H. Lowe

(collectively "Lowes" hereafter), as guarantors of the Promissory
Note executed by Rite Way Concrete Forming, Inc• ("Rite Way"
hereafter).
Summary judgment was rendered by the Honorable Dean E.
Conder on March 5, 1984.

(See Exhibit "B" in the Appendix)

The

Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the awarding of summary
judgment by the trial court. Valley Bank and Trust Company v.
Rite Way Concrete Forming, Inc., et al., 64 Utah Adv. Rep. 66, 67
(Ct. App. 1987) .
STATEMENT OF PACTS
Rite Way executed a Promissory Note - Security Agreement, dated June 17, 1977, in the principal sum of $15,000,
together with interest at 12.75$ per annum, payable in fortyeight (48) equal monthly installments, beginning on July 24,
1977.

(R. 53, 54). The Promissory Note was secured by colla-

teral which included concrete forming equipment.

Valley Bank v.

Rite Way, 64 Utah Adv. Rep. at 67.
On June 1, 1977, the Lowes executed guaranty agreements
with Valley Bank guaranteeing the existing and future obligations
of Rite Way with Valley Bank.

(R. 57, 59).

After execution of the note and security agreement, the
Lowes conveyed all of their interest in Rite Way to Don Bailey
Construction, Inc., ("Bailey") which assumed the $15,000 obligation to Valley Bank.

In connection with this transaction, Rite

Way transferred ownership of the cement forming equipment to
Bailey.

Bailey subsequently subcontracted to do work for

Jacobsen-Robbins Construction Company, a general contractor.

Id.

Upon Bailey's failure to complete the subcontract, it
surrendered the concrete forming equipment to Jacobsen-Robbins
and defaulted on the loan obligation to Valley Bank.

Upon

Bailey's default, Valley Bank sued and entered default judgment
against Bailey.

Judgment was not satisfied by Bailey because the

corporation ceased doing business without satisfying the debt.
Id.
Valley Bank accelerated the note and demanded that the
Lowes pay the balance of the obligation of $4,494.71 because of
their personal guaranties.

(R. 50-52)

Lowes refused to pay the

balance, but, instead, met with Valley Bank officers and offered
to locate the collateral and assist with its repossession.

Lowes

asserted that they gave Valley Bank a specific description of the
equipment and its location, and authorized Valley Bank to
repossess it.

Valley Bank never

control over the collateral.

acquired actual physical

Id.

On October 12, 1982, without the Lowes' awareness or
consent, and reserving its rights against Rite Way, Valley Bank
released its interest in the cement forms in Jacobsen-Robbins1
possession after Jacobsen-Robbins notified Valley Bank that
Conesco claimed ownership of the forms. •*•
Valley Bank brought a successful motion for summary
judgment against the Lowes.

The trial court in a memorandum

decision (R. 192-194) (see Exhibit "C" in Appendix) found the
Lowes' guaranty was absolute and unconditional because it
1

The Court of Appeals assumed the truthfulness of the Lowes'
statement that these cement forms were substantially the same
equipment described in Valley Bank's security agreement.
Valley Bank v. Rite Way, 64 Utah Adv. Rep. at 67.

provided that the guarantors "severally guarantee payment when
due of any and all obligation of Borrowers

to Bank when due or

any and all obligations of Borrower to Bank now existing of which
may hereafter arise of whatsoever nature and however represented,
and whether secured or unsecured."

(emphasis in original).

Id.

The trial court entered judgment in favor of Valley Bank for
$4,494.71 principal, $1,884.78 interest, $2,800 attorneyTs fees
and $51.50 court costs.
ARGUMENT FOR ISSUANCE OP THE WRIT
A writ of certiorari should be granted because the
decision of the Court of Appeals decides a question of state law
that is in conflict with prior decisions of this court.

Under

the decision, the Court of Appeals allows a claim for subrogation
by a guarantor without having the guarantor first make payment of
the underlying obligation.
In addition, a writ of certiorari should also be
granted because the Court of Appeals applies provisions of the
Uniform Commercial Code that, as a matter of law, cannot be
applied to Valley Bank's guaranty agreements with the Lowes as
the agreements are not subject to the Uniform Commercial Code.
POINT I
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN REVERSING THE
SUMMARY JUDGMENT GRANTED BY THE TRIAL COURT
IN HOLDING THAT AN ISSUE OF FACT EXISTS AS
TO LOWES1 RIGHTS OF SUBROGATION TO THE
COLLATERAL GIVEN AS SECURITY TO VALLEY BANK.

The Court of Appeals uses the analysis of StrevellPatterson Co. v. Francis, 646 P.2d 741 (Utah 1982), in holding
that the Valley Bank guaranty agreement is an absolute guaranty
of payment. Valley Bank v. Rite Way, 64 Utah Adv. Rep. at 68.
The language in the guaranty agreement states as follows:
"VALLEY BANK AND TRUST COMPANY," a corporation,
hereinafter referred to as "Bank," has
extended credit and/or agreed to extend credit
and/or furnished or agreed to furnish other
accomodations to the person hereinafter
identified as "Borrower," and the undersigned
Guarantors, in consideration of such credit
and/or accomodations by Bank to Borrower
jointly and severally guarantee payment when
due of any and all obligations of Borrower to
Bank now existing or which may hereafter arise
of whatsoever nature and however represented,
and whether secured or unsecured. (emphasis
added)
(Copies of the guaranty agreements are attached as Exhibit "D,"
in the Appendix)

The Court of Appeals then states that the

Lowes' liability for the loan with Valley Bank became fixed upon
the default of the primary obligor, Bailey.

Id.

The Court of Appeals next addresses the issue of
subrogation.

The court states that a guarantor, upon payment of

the guaranteed obligation, has a right of subrogation to any
collateral pledged as security, (emphasis added)

Ld.

The Court

of Appeals erred in reversing the summary judgment because it
awards rights of subrogation to the Lowes, as guarantors, even
though the Lowes never made payment on the guaranteed obligation.

The right of subrogration to the collateral does not

exist until the Lowes make payment of the guaranteed obligation.

The very legal sources cited by the Court of Appeals
supports the rule that a guarantor does not have the right to
subrogation and the corresponding right to the collateral given
as security until the guarantor makes payment of the guaranteed
obligation.

See Behlen Mfg. Co. v. First National Bank, 28 Colo.

Ct. App. 300, 472 P.2d 703, 706 (1970).

The Court of Appeals

relies upon this Colorado case throughout its analysis and yet
fails to take into account the facts of the case.

In Behlen

Mfg. the guarantor first made payment of the underlying obligation in order to have rights of subrogation.

Id.

Only when the guarantor makes payment of the guaranteed
obligation do the rights of subrogation accrue.
Rite Way, 64 Utah Adv. Rep. at 68.

Valley Bank v.

In the instant action, the

Lowes did not pay the underlying obligation and therefore are
not entitled to any claim for subrogation.

The Court of Appeals

fails to acknowledge this important rule of law and therefore
gives the Lowes rights of subrogation to the collateral.
The effect of the decision by the Court of Appeals on
the issue of subrogation makes Valley Bank's guaranty agreement
no longer an "unconditional" guaranty of payment
"conditional" guaranty of collection.

but instead a

The Court of Appeals'

analysis is inconsistent with this court's opinion in StrevellPatterson, supra, which sets forth the distinction between a
guaranty of payment and a guaranty of collection.

Because the

Court of Appeals fails to properly apply the law with respect to
subrogation, it errs in ruling that an issue of fact exists to
preclude summary judgment from being affirmed on appeal.

POINT II
THE COURT OP APPEALS ERRED AS A MATTER OP LAW
IN APPLYING PROVISIONS OP THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE TO THE GUARANTY AGREEMENT OP VALLEY BANK.
After analyzing the general rule of subrogation rights
of a guarantor after it has made payment on the guaranteed
obligation, the Court of Appeals then supports its conclusion by
stating that the general rule has been codified in Utah in the
Uniform Commercial Code and as contained at Utah Code Ann.
§ 70A-3-606(l) (1980).

Valley Bank v. Rite Way, 64 Utah Adv. Rep.

at 68. The Court of Appeals references this particular section
of the Uniform Commercial Code to establish that there are issues
of fact that justify reversing the trial courtTs summary judgment
In remanding the case to the trial court, the Court of Appeals
also sets forth the issues for the trial court to review and
specifically makes reference to the provisions of the Uniform
Commercial Code,

§ 70A-3-606(l) (1980) . Id.

The Court of Appeals erred in applying the Uniform
Commercial Code to the guaranty agreement of Valley Bank.

The

guaranty agreements executed by the Lowes are dated June 1, 1977.
(R. 57, 59). The Promissory Note - Security Agreement executed
by Rite Way for the loan from Valley Bank is dated June 17, 1977.
(R. 53, 5^). The guaranty agreements are not a part of nor are
they the same document as the Promissory Note - Security
Agreement.
The Uniform Commercial Code sections referred to by the
Court of Appeals, specifically § 70A-3-606(l), should not be
applied to the guaranties executed by the Lowes.

In order to

apply the provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code to the
guaranty agreements, the "instrument" as referred to in
§ 70A-3-606(l) must be a negotiable instrument as defined under
§ 70A-3-102(l)(e).

The guaranty agreements are not negotiable

instruments but rather separate contracts of guarantee.

This

argument was raised to the Court of Appeals not only at oral
argument but also in the briefs presented to the court. The
Court of Appeals did not address the negotiability requirement.
Numerous jurisdictions have held that a guaranty
agreement of this nature is not a negotiable instrument but
rather a separate contract of guarantee and, as such, the provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code are not applicable.

See,

e.g., Crown Life Ins. Co. v. LaBonte, 111 Wis.2d 26, 330 N.W.2d
201 (1983); Halpin v. Frankenberger, 231 Kan. 344, 644 P.2d 452,
456 (1982); Kansas State Bank and Trust Co. v. DeLorean, 7
Kan.App.2d 246, 640 P.2d 343, 350 (1982); First Nat. Bank of
Albuquerque v. Energy Eg- Inc., 91 N.M. 11, 569 P.2d 421, 426
(1977).

2

The Court of Appeals erred in applying the provisions
of the Uniform Commercial Code to the Valley Bank guaranty
agreement.

The code provisions do not apply to a guaranty

agreement that is not by itself a negotiable instrument.
2
The Utah Supreme Court has addressed the use of the
provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code to a guaranty
agreement in Continental Bank and Trust Co. v. Utah Security
Mortgage, Inc., et al., 701 P.2d 1095 (Utah 19«5). In that
decision the court never addresses the argument that the
provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code were not
applicable to the guaranty agreement of Continental Bank and
Trust Company.

CONCLUSION
As a matter of law the Court of Appeals erred in its
decision.

A right of subrogation does not exist for a guarantor

until the underlying debt has been paid.

The Lowes never

paid

the underlying obligation to entitle them to rights of subrogation to the collateral.

Furthermore, as a matter of law, the

Court of Appeals erred in applying the provisions of the Uniform
Commercial Code to the guaranty agreement of Valley Bank. The
agreement is not a negotiable instrument to be included within
the provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code.

Petitioner,

Valley Bank and Trust Company, respectfully requests that a writ
of certiorari be granted.
DATED this j?cJ day of September, 1987.
BIELE, HASLAM & HATCH

Pkal D. Veasy
(JN>
Attorneys for Petitioner

APPENDIX

the certificates in this form [was] a tacit acquiescence in, and submission to, the bylaw." Id.
The court concluded:
We know of no rule of law which
forbids stock-holders to form with
each other a convention of this
nature. It is not forbidden by the
terms of the charter, and certainly
cannot be held to be against public
policy .... [Although the silence of
the lawgiver in a particular charter,
is a strong argument against the
implication of such a power as an
incident to the administration of the
corporation,4 it is no reason for
frustrating the wishes and agreement . of the stockholders themselves.
Id. at 317-18. See also W. Fletcher, Cyclopedia of the Law of Private* Corporations,
§1858 (rev. perm. ed. 1985).
In more recent cases, courts have reiterated
the nature and effect of bylaws. In Dentel v.
Fidelity Sav. and Loan Assoc, 539 P.2d 649
(Or. 1975), the Supreme Court of Oregon
held, "The bylaws of the corporation have
been termed a contract between the members
of the corporation, and between the corporation and its members." Id. at 650-51. The
Court of Appeals of Oregon added, *[A]n
invalid bylaw can be enforced as a contract.
There are two principal limitations on the
enforcement of an invalid bylaw as a contract.
First, such indirect enforcement is only possible against a stockholder who has assented to
the bylaw ... [and second] the substance of the
bylaw must not be inconsistent with public
policy." Jones v. Wallace, 616 P.2d 575, 577
(Or.App. 1980).:
Under the foregoing analysis, article 12 of
the bylaws was perhaps invalid as a matter of
general corporate law since it arguably allowed
for forfeiture of stock without charter authorization. Nevertheless, summary judgment
shall be granted only if the evidence before the
court shows "there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Utah
R. Civ. P. 56(c). As a matter of contract law,
several material issues of fact'.exist which
preclude entry of partial summary judgment.
Was there a contract between the parties?
Plaintiff argues the bvlaws were never signed
or adopted nor did he or.McBride ever agree
to them.3 Defendants argue 4 all the parties
agreed to the bylaws. What do the ambiguous
provisions of the bylaw/contract mean? At
trial, defendants argued plaintiffs stock automatically reverted .upon termination of his
employment with Dalbo, Inc. If so, why did
defendants negotiate with plaintiff to purchase
his stock and why was McBride paid for his?
On appeal, defendants argue article 12 did not
provide for a forfeiture, but rather a buy-sell

agreement. Another interpretation of article 12
is that it created a condition precedent, i.e,
three years of employment, to the vesting of
stockholder status. Such ambiguity creates a
material issue of fact, see Seashores Inc. v.
Hancey, 738 P.2d 645 (Utah App. 1987), and
highlights the difficulty in resolving the case
on summary judgment.
We hold the trial court erred in granting
plaintiffs motion for partial summary judgment and we reverse. Since the partial
summary judgment set into play the entire
chain of subsequent proceedings, we also
reverse all subsequent orders and judgments
and remand the case for trial.
Russell W. Bench, Judge
WE CONCUR:
Judith M. Billings, Judge
Gregory K. Orme, Judge
1. "Any person who is a shareholder of record,
upon written demand stating the purpose thereof,
shall have the right to examine, in person, or by
agent or attorney, at any reasonable time or times,
for any proper purpose, its books and records of
account, minutes and record of shareholders and to
make extracts therefrom. A proper purpose means a
purpose reasonably related to the person's interest
as a shareholder."
2. "Any officer or agent who, or a corporation
which, shall refuse to allow any such shareholder, or
his agent or attorney, so to examine and make extracts from its books and records of account,
minutes, and record of shareholders, for any proper
purpose, shall be liable to such shareholder in a
penalty of 1097o of the value of the shares owned by
such shareholder, in addition to any other damages
or remedy afforded him by law; but no such penalty
shall exceed 55,000/
3. Bylaws need not be signed to be adopted. Marsh
v. Mathias, 19 Utah 350,56 P. 1074 (1899).
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VALLEY BANK AND TRUST COMPANY,
a Utah corporation
Plaintiff,
v.
RITE WAY CONCRETE FORMING, INC.,
a Utah corporation, Peter Lowe, Jr. J.
Randall Outsen, Tracy M. Jones. Richard H.
Lowe, and Don Bailey Construction, Inc., a
Utah corporation,
Defendants,
and
Peter Lowe, Jr., and Richard H. Lowe,
Cross-Complainants, Third-Party
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
v.
Don Bailey Construction, Inc., a Utah
For complete Utah Code Annotations, consult CodcoCo's Annotation Service
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corporation,
Cross-Defendants and Respondents,
and
Don Bailey, Draper Bank, a Utah corporation,
and Jacobsen-Robbins Construction
Company, Inc., a Utah corporation,
Third-Party Defendants.
Before Judges Orme, Davidson and Garff.
No. 860018-CA
FILED: September 1,1987
THIRD DISTRICT
Honorable Dean £. Conder
ATTORNEYS:
Arthur H. Nielsen, Richard Hincks for
Jacobsen-Robbins.
Dwight L. King for Draper Bank.
Arthur F. Sandack for Tracy Jones.
K. L. Mclff for Lowes.
Paul D. Veasy, W. Jeffery Fillmore for Valley
Bank.
OPINION

doing business without satisfying the debt.
The Bank then accelerated the note and
demanded that the Lowes pay the entire
balance of $4,494.71 because of their personal
guaranties. The Lowes refused to pay the
balance, but, instead, met with Bank officers
and offered to locate the collateral and assist
with its repossession. They spent a considerable amount of time and effort doing so, and
allege that they succeeded in locating virtually
all of the secured equipment on the JacobsenRobbins job sitesc They also assert that they
gave the Bank a specific description of the
equipment and its location, and authorized the
Bank to repossess it. For purposes of reviewing this summary judgment, we review the
facts and inferences in the light most favorable
to the Lowes. Atlas Corp, v. Clovis Nat'l
Bank, 737 P.2d 225,229 (Utah 1987).
Although the Bank never acquired actual
physical control over the collateral, it is
unclear whether it had the opportunity or the
right to do so. On October 12, 1982, without
the Lowes' awareness or consent, and reserving its rights against Rite Way,1 the Bank
released its interest in the cement forms in
Jacobsen-Robbins' possession after JacobsenRobbins notified the Bank that Conesco
claimed ownership of the forms. Under the
summary judgment standard of review, we
assume the truthfulness of the Lowes' statement that these cement forms were substantially the same equipment described in the security agreement. As a consequence of this
release, the Bank was unable to satisfy the
loan balance from the collateral.
The Bank brought a successful motion for
summary judgment against the Lowes. The
trial court in a memorandum decision found
that the Lowes' guaranty was absolute and
unconditional because it provided that the
guarantors "severally guarantee payment when
due of any and all obligations of Borrowers to
Bank when due or any and all obligations of
Borrower to Bank now existing or which may
hereafter arise of whatsoever nature and
however represented, and whether secured or
unsecured0 (emphasis in original).
The trial court entered judgment in favor of
the Bank for $4,494.71 principal, $1,884.78
interest, $2,800.00 attorneys' fees, and $51.50
court costs.
The * Lowes raise the following issues on
appeal: (1) In releasing the collateral, did the
Bank discharge the Lowes from their guaranty
agreements? (2) Was the award of attorney
fees against the Lowes improper?

GARFF, Judge:
Defendants Peter Lowe, Jr. and Richard H.
Lowe appeal from a summary judgment in
favor of plaintiff Valley Bank and Trust
(Bank) finding defendants liable as guarantors
of a promissory note executed by Rite Way
Concrete Forming, Inc. (Rite Way) and awarding plaintiff attorney fees. We remand for
hearing consistent with this opinion.
Rite Way executed a promissory note for
$15,000.00 at 12.75Vo interest per annum in
favor of the Bank for the purpose of purchasing concrete forming equipment from
Conesco, a concrete forming equipment supplier. This note was secured by collateral
consisting of the concrete forming equipment
and a 1977 Chevrolet two-ton flat-bed
truck, and by the personal guarantees of
several persons, including Peter and Richard
Lowe.
After execution of the note and the security
agreements, the Lowes conveyed all of their
interest in Rite Way to Don Bailey Construction;- Inc. (Bailey), which assumed the
$15,000.00 obligation to the Bank. In connection with this transaction, Rite Way transferred ownership of the flat-bed truck and the
cement forming equipment to Bailey> .which
subsequently subcontracted to do work for
Jacobsen-Robbins. Construction Co., a
general contractor. Upon Bailey's failure to
L
satisfactorily complete the subcontract, it
The first issue is whether the Lowes were
surrendered the secured equipment to Jacobsen-Robbins and defaulted on the loan discharged from their guaranty agreements
obligation to the Bank. Upon Bailey's default, when the Bank released the collateral securing
the Bank sued and entered default judgment the loan.
Whether a creditor has a duty to pursue the
against it. However, Don Bailey, the corporate
owner, disappeared and the corporation ceased debtor or the collateral securing the loan as a
For complete Utah Code Annotations, onsnlt Code • Co's Annotation Service

precondition to pursuing the guarantor
clepends "on the nature of the guarantor's
promise." Strevell-Paterson Co. v. Francis,
046 P.2d 741, 743 (Utah 1982)(quoting Westjnghouse Credit Corp. v. Hydroswift Corp.,
« 8 P.2d 156,158 (Utah 1974)).
The nature of the guarantor's promise
clepends upon whether it is absolute or conditional. An absolute guaranty is defined as:
a contract by which the guarantor
has promised that if the debtor does
not perform his obligation or obligations, the guarantor will perform
some act (such as the payment of
<noofity\ ta <K Cat th& heasftt QC th&
creditor .... A guaranty of the
payment of 'an obligation, without
words of limitation or condition, is
construed as an absolute or unconditional guaranty.
28 Am. Jur. 2d Guaranty § 21 (1968). This
unconditional obligation, sometimes referred
( o a s a guaranty of payment, holds the guarantor liable, without notice, upon the default
Of the principal. Mack Fin. Corp. v. Scott,
100 Idaho 889, 606 P.2d 993, 998 (1980). Such
t guaranty is "absolute, and the guaranteed
party need not fix its losses by pursuing its
remedies against the debtor or the security
pefore proceeding directly against the guarantor/ Strevell-Paterson Co. v. Francis, 646
f.2dat743.
On the other hand, a conditional guaranty,
or guaranty of collection, is an obligation to
pay or perform if payment or performance
cannot be first reasonably obtained from the
principal obligor. Id.
The Utah Supreme Court, in StreveUpaterson, found that the guaranty contract at
issue was an absolute guaranty of payment
gather than a guaranty of collection, because it
'contained no express or implied condition on
liability and no contractual requirement that
the creditor seek satisfaction elsewhere before
commencing action on the guarantee/ Id. at
•743-44.
Likewise, the present guaranty contract
contains language that indicates that it is an
absolute guaranty of payment rather than only
£ guaranty of collection:
"VALLEY BANK AND TRUST
COMPANY/ a corporation, here-,
inafter referred to as "Bank", has
€x\enfo6 cit&\ an&DT agite&, to
extend credit and/or furnished, or
agreed to furnish other accomodations to the person hereinafter identified as "Borrower", and the
undersigned Guarantors, in consideration of such credit and/or
accomodations by Bank to Borrower jointly and severally guarantee
payment when due of, any and all

obligations of Borrower to Bank
now existing or which may hereafter
arise of whatsoever nature and
however represented, and whether
secured or unsecured (Emphasis
added).
As in Strevell-Paterson, there are no additional clauses stating an "express or implied
condition on liability/ nor is there a contractual requirement that the creditor seek satisfaction elsewhere on the guaranty. See StrevellPaterson, 646 P.2d at 744. Therefore, the
Lowes' liability for the loan became fixed
upon the default of the primary obligor, Don
Bailey.
However, a guarantor, upon payment of the
guaranteed obligation, has a right of subrogation to any collateral pledged as security.
Behlen Mfg. Co. v. First National Bank, 28
Colo. Ct. App. 300, 472 P.2d 703, 706 (1970);
D. W. Jaquays & Co. v. First Security Bank,
101 Ariz. 301, 419 P.2d 85, 89 (1966). This is
true even of an absolute guarantor. This right
to subrogation is a "creature of equity/ whose
"purpose is the prevention of injustice and is
the mode which equity adopts to compel the
ultimate payment of a debt by one who in
justice, equity, and good conscience ought to
pay it." Behlen Mfg. Co., All P.2d at 707
(quoting D. W. Jaquays & Co., 419 P.2d at
88). The rationale is that the creditor, having
elected to proceed against security for payment
of the debt, is deemed to be in a trustee relationship with the guarantor. The creditor may
liquidate the security and apply the proceeds
to the obligation, or he may forego recourse
to the security and proceed against the guarantor of payment, provided he does not
subvert the guarantor's subrogation rights
against collateral pledged by the principal
obligor. If he breaches that trust duty by
destroying, losing, or otherwise improvidently
dissipating the collateral, he may not hold the
guarantor wholly liable because the guarantor
would have been subrogated to the creditor's
right of resort to that security. 38 Am. Jur. 2d
|\ Guaranty § 84 (1968). Thus, where a credjitor's actions impair the value of collateral in
|) its possession which secures an obligation
guaranteed by a guarantor, either absolute or
conditional, the guarantor will be discharged
from his obligation to the extent of the impairment. Mack Fin. Corp. v. Scott, 606 P.2d
at 998.
This general rule has been codified in Utah
through the Uniform Commercial Code. Utah
Code Ann. § 70A-3-606(l)(1980) states:
The holder discharges any party to
the instrument to the extent that
without such party's consent the
holder ... (b) unjustifiably impairs
any collateral for the instrument
given by or on behalf of- the party
or any person against whom he has
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a right of recourse.
Appellants rely on this general rule to
support their argument that they should escape
liability on their guaranty contracts because
the Bank's release of the collateral was unjustified.
However, as an exception to this general
rule, an absolute guarantor may explicitly
waive his rights against collateral. Under the
language of Section 70A-3-606(l)(b), the
holder does not discharge a party to the instrument if the party consents to allow the
holder to impair the collateral. Thus, a finding
that the guarantors so consented renders
Section 3-606 discharge unavailable even if
the holder unjustifiably impairs the collateral.
The Official Comment to Section 3-606 of
the Uniform Commercial Code indicates that
such consent may be given in advance in the
guaranty agreement:
Consent may be given in advance,
and is commonly incorporated in
the instrument. It requires no consideration, and operates as a waiver
of the consenting party's right to
claim his own discharge.
See also National Acceptance Co. of America
v. Demes, 446 F. Supp. 388, 390 (D. 111.
1977).
Such consent must be explicit and "should
only be by the most unequivocal language in
the guaranty agreement." Behlen Mfg. Co.,
All P.2d at 708 (quoting D. W. Jaquays &
Co., 419 P.2d at 89); See also Mack Fin.
Corp., 606 P.2d at 1000.
For example, an explicit contract was found
in Joe Heaston Tractor & Implement Co. v.
Sec. Acceptance Corp., 243 F.2d 196, 198 n.l
(10th Cir. 1957):
The undersigned grants to the
Finance Company full power to
modify or change terms of any of
the Liabilities, to agree to forbearance with respect thereto, to
consent to the substitution or exchange or release of collateral
thereto, and extension of time of
payment of the Liabilities.
Likewise, the guaranty agreement in National Acceptance Co. of America v. Demes,
446 F. Supp. at 390, was found to be an
unequivocal waiver of rights against collateral.
The undersigned hereby waive
notice of the following events or
occurrences: ... the holder's obtaining, amending, substituting or
releasing, waiving, or modifying
any ... security interests, liens, or
encumbrances; [or] ... the holder's
... hereafter accepting ... any collateral securing the payment ... or
said holder's settling, subordina-

ting, compromising, discharging, or
releasing the same. The undersigned
agree that the holder of the Note
may ... do any or all of the foregoing events or occurrences in such
manner, upon such terms and at
such times as said holder, in its sole
and absolute discretion, deems
advisable, without in any way or
respect impairing, affecting, reducing, or releasing the undersigned
from their obligations hereunder ....
Id. See also Schauss v. Garner, 590 P.2d 1316
(Wyo. 1979).
In contrast, the court in Behlen Mfg. Co.
found that language in the guaranty agreement2
did not meet this test because "the only
waiver in the guaranty agreement [had] to do
with notice of nonpayment, protest, extension
of the note and partial payment. There [was]
no waiver relating to the collateral. The indemnity agreement is limited to expense, loss or
damage incurred in accepting the collateral or
incurred in enforcing collection." Id. at 708,
(emphasis added). See also Mack Fin. Corp. v.
Scott, 100 Idaho 889, 606 P.2d 993, 1000
(1980).
Similarly, the Arizona court, in Jaquays,
found that guarantors' subrogation rights
were not impaired because consent to impair
the collateral was not explicitly given, stating
that the following language was insufficient to
constitute an unequivocal waiver of rights
against the collateral: "and in connection
therewith consents without notice to any extensions or forbearance by assignee, and waives
any demand or notice of default." Jaquays,
419P.2dat88.
In the present case, there are no explicit
waivers of rights against collateral in the
Lowes' guaranty agreements. The only language which could be remotely construed to be
a waiver of rights against collateral states that
the Lowes "jointly and severally guarantee
payment when due of any and all obligations
of Borrower to Bank now existing or which
may hereafter arise of whatsoever nature and
however represented, whether secured or
unsecured."
In interpreting this language, we recognize
that ian instrument purporting* to establish
liability against a guarantor must be construed
strictly, and any ambiguities must be resolved
against the drafter of the instrument. National
Acceptance Co, of America v. Demes, 446 F.
Supp. at 391. This present language deals with
the guarantors' liability for any loans made to
the debtor, whether secured or unsecured, not
with any waiver relating to collateral. Construed strictly against the Bank, it does not
explicitly waive any. subrogation rights to
collateral.
Therefore, assuming the Bank had control
over the collateral, as the Lowes contend, we
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conclude that it had a duty to preserve the
Lowes' interest in the property held as security and that performance of this duty was not
waived by the Lowes' unconditional guaranties because the Lowes did not expressly
consent to impairment of the collateral. See
Jaquays, 419 P.2d at 89.
Whether the Lowes can prevail, however,
depends upon two factors: If the forms which
the Lowes found were the actual collateral
and, if so, whether the Bank had control over
them.3Further, a guarantor is released from
his liability only to the extent of the injury
caused by the failure of the creditor to protect
his security interest, if the creditor was in
control of the property held as security. Utah
Code Ann. §70A-3-606(l)(1980); see
Jaquays, 419 P.2d at 89; Mack Fin. Corp. v.
Scott, 606 P.2d at 998.
Since there are genuine issues of material
fact as to whether the Bank had control over
the collateral and whether the forms released
by the Bank were, in fact, the collateral securing the note guaranteed by the Lowes, the
summary judgment must be set aside. Atlas,
737 P.2d at 229. This conclusion renders any
discussion concerning disposition of the collateral in a commercially reasonable manner
unnecessary.
II.
The -second issue raised by appellants was
whether the award of $2,800 in attorney fees
was proper. It is undisputed that the Lowes
were liable for attorney fees.4 What is at issue
is the amount of the fee.
On February 24, 1984, Veasy, the Bank's
counsel, filed an affidavit in support of attorney fees with the court, but failed to serve a
copy on Mclff, counsel for the Lowes. Mclff
received, on Feb. 27, 1984, a copy of the
proposed judgment from Veasy which indicated that the Lowes were liable for $2,800 in
attorney fees. He called Veasy that day to
inform him of the lack of affidavits or documentation supporting the award of attorney
fees and, on Feb. 28, 1984, filed an affidavit
alleging that the attorney fee award was excessive and the supporting affidavit was not
timely
filed.
*
The trial court entered judgment on March
5, 1984, for $4,494.71 principal, $1,884.78
interest, $2,800 attorney fees, and $51.50 court
costs. Mclff stated that "he finally received^'a
copy of the affidavit in support of attorney
fees on March 7,4984, and, on the same day,
filed a motion in opposition to plaintiffs
affidavit in support of attorney fees. On April
4, 1984, Mclff filed an affidavit in which, he
brought these facts again to the court's attention.
The Utah Supreme Court has stated that
"[ejven if there .were no disputed issue of
material fact, the summary judgment cannot
award an attorney's fee without a stipulation

as to the amount, an unrebutted affidavit, or
evidence given as to the value thereof." Freec
Fin. Co. v. Stoker Motor Co., 537 P.2d 1039
1040 (Utah 1975). In the instant case, there
was not only a lapse of due process in that
judgment was entered before appellant had an
opportunity to see and respond to respondent's affidavit on attorney fees, but appellants rebutted respondent's affidavit. Accordingly, the award of attorney fees was impr
oper. Since the judgment appealed from h
reversed, the award of attorney fees falls a<
well, and fresh consideration of the attorney
fee question will, of course, be appropriate.
Reversed and remanded for trial consistent
with this opinion.
R. W. Garff, Judge
WE CONCUR:
Richard C. Davidson, Judge
Gregory K. Orme, Judge
1. The Bank's release stated that "[b]y disclaimiiv
any interest in and to the forms set forth as descr
ibed herein, Valley Bank and Trust Company doe
not release or waive any right under its Seamr
Interest and Financing Statement with Rite-Wa^
Concrete Forming, Inc., Debtor,..."
2. The specific provisions in the guaranty agreemen
were as follows: Behlen agreed "to fully indemnify
and .save the Bank harmless against all expense, loss
damage or injury arising in connection with tht
above note, or in the acceptance of any collatera
therefor, or which may be incurred in enforcing
collection of the same .... " Behlen Mfg. Co., 411
P.2dat706.
3. The Bank conceded, for purposes of this appeal
only, that it had such control. Our decision in no
way precludes the Bank from proving at trial that it
in fact, had no such control.
4. The relevant portion of the loan contract states
*[a]U costs and expenses of Bank, in retaking
holding, preparing for sale and selling or otherwist
realizing upon the collateral in the event of defaul
by Borrower, including court costs and reasonable
attorney's fees and legal expenses, shall constitute
additional indebtedness of the Borrower securec
hereby which the borrower promises to pay or
demand." The Guaranty agreement is in accord
"Each Guarantor agrees to pay all costs and expe
nses, including reasonable attorney's fees incurrec
in enforcing this agreement."
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
VALLEY BANK AND TRUST COMPANY,
a Utah corporation,
Plaintiff,

vs.
RITE WAY CONCRETE FORMING,
INC., a Utah corporation,
PETER LOWE JR., J. RANDALL
OUTSEN, TRACY M. JONES,
RICHARD H. LOWE and DON
BAILEY CONSTRUCTION, INC.,
a Utah corporation,
Defendants.
PETER LOWE, JR., and
RICHARD H. LOWE,

JUDGMENT

Cross-complainants and
Third-party P l a i n t i f f s ,
C i v i l No. C-81-487

vs.

L niiTSEW, TRAGY H, « § ,
DON BAILEY CONSTRUCTION, INC.,
a Utah corporation,
Cross-defendants,

and
DON BAILEY, DRAPER BANK, a
Utah corporation, and

EXHIBIT NO.

JACOBSEN-ROBBINS CONSTRUCTION
COMPANY, INC., a Utah corporation,

Third-party Defendants.

The above-entitled matter came on regularly for hearing on
Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment against Defendants, Rite Way
Concrete Forming, Inc., Peter Lowe, Jr., and Richard H. Lowe, before the
Honorable Dean E. Conder, Judge of the above-entitled Court on the 14th day
of February, 1984, at the hour of 1:00 p.m.
Plaintiff appeared by and through its counsel, Paul D. Veasy of
Biele, Haslam & Hatch.

The Defendants, Rite Way Concrete Forming, Inc.,

Peter Lowe, Jr., and Richard H. Lowe, appeared by and through their
counsel, K. L. Mclff of Jackson, Mclff & Mower.

The Court having consi-

dered the evidence presented by counsel, being fully advised in the
premises, and having rendered its Memorandum Decision on file herein:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED:
Plaintiff is awarded Judgment jointly and severally against the
Defendants, Rite Way Concrete Forming, Inc., Peter Lowe, Jr., and Richard
H. Lowe, for the principal sum of $4,494.71, accrued interest in the sum of
$1,884.78 calculated to February 14, 1984, together with interest on said
Judgment at the rate of 12.75% per annum until paid, reasonable attorney's
fee in the amount of $2,800, and costs of Court incurred herein in the sum
of $51.50.

DATED this

£>

day of"FStm*ary, 1984.
BY THE COURT:

DEAN E. CONDER
District Court Judge
ATTT3T

BY

FILuD ,./CLERK'S OFFICE
Cn!t Lake County. Utah
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FILMED
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
VALLEY BANK AND TRUST COMPANY,
a Utah c o r p o r a t i o n ,
Plaintiff,
vs..

RITE WAY CONCRETE FORMING,
INC., a Utah corporation,
OUTSEN, TRACY M. JONES,
RICHARD H. LOWE, and DON
BAILEY CONSTRUCTION, INC.,
a Utah corporation,
Defendants
and

MEMORANDUM DECISION

PETER LOWE, JR. and
RICHARD H. LOWE,

C I V I L NO. C 8 1 - 4 8 7

Cros s-complainants
and Third-party
Plaintiffs,
vs
DON BAILEY CONSTRUCTION,
INC. , a Utah corporation,
Cross-defendants,
and
DON BAILEY, DRAPER BANK, a
Utah c o r p o r a t i o n , and
JACOBSEN-ROBBINS CONSTRUCTION
COMPANY, I N C . , a U t a h
corporation.
Third-party
Defendants.

EXHIBIT NO.

"c.

VALLEY BANK, ET AL V.
RITE WAY CONCRETE, ET AL

PAGE TWO

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment against defendants
and garantors Peter M. Lowe, Jr. and Richard H. Lowe is hereby
granted.

The "Guaranty" executed by each of the parties is an

absolute and unconditioned guarantee in that it provides that the
Guarantors "...severally guarantee payment when due of any and all
obligations of Borrowers to Bank now existing or which may hereafter
arise of whatsoever nature and however represented, and whether
secured or unsecured".

(Emphasis added)

70A-3-416(l) UCA 1953

provides, "'Payment guaranteed1 or equivalent words added to a
signature mean that the signer engages that if the instrument is not
paid when due he will pay it according to its tenor without resort
by the holder to any other party".

Using this analogy of the UCA to

the guaranty, the court finds that the plaintiff has a cause of
action against these defendants without first exhausting any remedies
it has against the primary obligor.

Furthermore, the Guaranty was

effective whether or not the obligation was secureid or unsecured.
Defendants Lowe argue that they located the security for the
benefit of the plaintiff and by reason of plaintiff's "release" and
failure to take possession of the security the plaintiff cannot pursue its action against these defendants.

Two things are against

this: (1) The guaranty signed by these defendants provides that they
are obligated on the loan "whether secured or unsecured"; also (2)
The case of Dunser v. Southeast First National Bank of Miami, 367
So. 2d 1094 (1979) states the law as follows:

VALLEY BANK, ET AL V.
RITE WAY CONCRETE, ET AL

PAGE THREE

MEMORANDUM DECISION

"Finally, a most peirsuasive argument against
reversal in the instant cause is the well-established
principle that under an absolute and unconditional contract of guaranty, as is the subject matter of this
appeal, it is no defense that the creditor has lost
security or has been negligent in regard to protection
of the collateral. Fegley v. Jennings, 44 Fla. 203, 32
So. 873 (1902) and A & T Motors, Inc. v. Roemelmeyer,
158 So.2d 567 (Fla. 3d DCA 1964)."
The third-party defendant, Jacobsen-Robbins, has also
filed a motion for summary judgment against the third party plaintiffs, Lowe.

At the hearing on this matter the third-party plain-

tiffs, Lowe, moved to dismiss its third-party complaint.

Motion

is granted without prejudice.

Dated this

/ 5>

day of February, 1984.

DEAN E. CONDER, DISTRICT JUDGE

* *~ *~i

GUARANTY
VALLEY BANK A N D TRUST COMPANY, a corporation, hereinafter referred to as " B a n k " , has extended credit

and

agreed to extend credit a n d / o r furnished or agreed to furnish other accommodations to the person hereinafter identified
" B o r r o w e r " , a n d the undersigned Guarantors, in consideration of such credit a n d / o r accommodations by Bank to Borrov
jointly a n d severally guarantee payment when due of any and all obligations of Borrower to Bank now existing or wh
may hereafter arise of whatsoever nature a n d however represented, a n d whether secured or unsecured.
This agreement is continuing in nature, it being specifically understood that unless indicated to the contrary at the e
hereof, the agreement is to encompass future accommodations a n d indebtednesses of Borrower as w e l l as existing indebt*
nesses of Borrower, a n d that a n y obligations or indebtednesses may be c h a n g e d , m o d i f i e d , increased, renewed, p a i d
reinstated, a l l without notice to the Guarantors or any o f them. The liability of any G u a r a n t o r for future advances, cred
or accommodations g r a n t e d by Bank to Borrower may be terminated

by such Guarantor

by furnishing written

notice

such termination a n d , a l t h o u g h this agreement remains in full force a n d effect as to then extant obligations of Borrow
thereby a l l o w i n g Bank to e x t e n d , modify or renew such extant obligations, Guarantor shall not be liable for new a d v a n '
or a d d i t i o n a l credits furnished to Borrower subsequent to the date the notice is received by the Bank.

This G u a r a n t y sh

remain in full force a n d effect until terminated in w r i t i n g even though from time to rime there may be no o b l i g a t i o n I
tween the Borrower a n d the Bank.
This agreement is severable as to each G u a r a n t o r , it being specifically understood that no one Guarantor is relyi
upon the obligations of any other Guarantor, a n d Bank may release or modify this agreement in relation to the o b l i g a t k
of one or more Guarantors w i t h o u t affecting the liability of a n y other G u a r a n t o r .
Each G u a r a n t o r agrees that his Guaranty is binding upon him without the signature of any other person or the ex
tence o f a n y other G u a r a n t y a n d that a termination notice served by any other G u a r a n t o r shall not affect the liability
a n y other G u a r a n t o r .
Each G u a r a n t o r agrees to pay all costs a n d expenses, including reasonable attorney's fees incurred in enforcing t
agreement.
Each G u a r a n t o r waives notice of any matter, default, presentment, d e m a n d , protest or dishonor between the Borrow
a n d Bank a n d agrees that any notice furnished to Borrower shall be deemed as being furnished to each Guarantor.

Not:

is w a i v e d o f acceptance hereof by Bank.
This instrument shall be b i n d i n g upon the heirs, personal representatives, successors a n d assigns of the Guarantor c
shall inure to the benefit of the Bank, its successors a n d assigns. This contract is assignable in w h o l e or in part without not
to Guarantors.

This w r i t i n g contains the entire agreement of the parties.

The undersigned specifically submits himself

the jurisdiction of the District Court of Salt Lake County, State o f Utah, a n d agrees that the laws of the State of Utah sh
govern this contract.

If the undersigned is without the territorial jurisdiction of such Court at the time Bank institutes a

action thereon, then service o f process from such Court served on the undersigned, regardless of where undersigned is
cated, a l l o w i n g sixty ( 6 0 )

days to answer such process shall be the o n l y condition to the exercise of such jurisdiction

said Court, the undersigned consenting to a n d submitting to such jurisdiction.
A notice to a G u a r a n t o r w i l l be deemed complete t w o ( 2 ) days after being placed in the United States M a i l , posta
p r e p a i d , addressed to the Guarantor at the address indicated after the Guarantor's signature.
The liability of each G u a r a n t o r is unlimited as to amount unless a limitation is indicated immediately in advance
Guarantor's signature, w h e r e u p o n the guarantee as to that Guarantor is limited to the indicated amount.
The Borrower hereinafter referred to is . . . . l ^ . i . ~ . g . _ T . . \ ^ A - Y - - . - - . < i l « ^

an

more th?

one Borrower is indicated, the reference " B o r r o w e r " in this agreement is joint a n d several.
I N WITNESS WHEREOF a n d by authority duly vested, the undersigned have caused this agreement to be executed
of this

./-.

d a y of

,-j.a/Us:.

, 19:2.7

GUARANTORS:

Limit:

U ^ ^ i M i T g f

.

Limit:

t ^ ^ ^ j s L - J L . . t«c
Guarantor
Address:.

_

/

Guarantor
Address:.

GUARANTY
VALLEY BANK A N D TRUST COMPANY, a corporation, hereinafter referred to as " B a n k " , has extended credit and
agreed to extend credit a n d / o r furnished or agreed to furnish other accommodations to the person hereinafter identified
" B o r r o w e r " , a n d the undersigned Guarantors, in consideration of such credit a n d / o r accommodations by Bank to Borrov
jointly a n d severally guarantee payment when due of any and all obligations of Borrower to Bank now existing or wh
may hereafter arise of whatsoever nature a n d however represented, a n d whether secured or unsecured.
This agreement is continuing in nature, it being specifically understood that unless indicated to the contrary at the e
hereof, the agreement is to encompass future accommodations a n d indebtednesses of Borrower as w e l l as existing indebt*
nesses of Borrower, a n d that any obligations or indebtednesses may be c h a n g e d , modified, increased, renewed, paid
reinstated, all without notice to the Guarantors or any of them. The liability of any Guarantor for future advances, cred
or accommodations granted by Bank to Borrower may be terminated

by such Guarantor

by furnishing written

notice

such termination a n d , although this agreement remains in full force a n d effect as to then extant obligations of Borrow
thereby a l l o w i n g Bank to extend, modify or renew such extant obligations, Guarantor shall not be liable for new advan
or a d d i t i o n a l credits furnished to Borrower subsequent to the date the notice is received by the Bank.

This Guaranty sh

remain in full force a n d effect until terminated in writing even though from time to time there may be no obligation

f

tween the Borrower a n d the Bank.
This agreement is severable as to each Guarantor, it being specifically understood that no one Guarantor is rely
upon the obligations of any other Guarantor, a n d Bank may release or modify this agreement in relation to the o b l i g a t k
of one or more Guarantors without affecting the liability of any other Guarantor.
Each Guarantor agrees that his Guaranty is binding upon him without the signature of any other person or the e>
tence of any other G u a r a n t y a n d that a termination notice served by any other Guarantor shall not affect the liability
any other Guarantor.
Each Guarantor agrees to pay all costs a n d expenses, including reasonable attorney's fees incurred in enforcing t
agreement.
Each Guarantor waives notice of any matter, default, presentment, demand, protest or dishonor between the Borrov*
a n d Bank a n d agrees that any notice furnished to Borrower shall be deemed as being furnished to each Guarantor.

Not

is w a i v e d of acceptance hereof by Bank.
This instrument shall be binding upon the heirs, personal representatives, successors a n d assigns of the Guarantor c
shall inure to the benefit of the Bank, its successors a n d assigns. This contract is assignable in w h o l e or in part without not
to Guarantors.

This writing contains the entire agreement of the parties.

The undersigned specifically submits himself

the jurisdiction of the District Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, a n d agrees that the laws of the State of Utah sh
govern this contract.

If the undersigned is without the territorial jurisdiction of such Court at the time Bank institutes c

action thereon, then service of process from such Court served on the undersigned, regardless of where undersigned is
cated, a l l o w i n g sixty ( 6 0 ) days to answer such process shall be the o n l y condition to the exercise of such jurisdiction
said Court, the undersigned consenting to a n d submitting to such jurisdiction.
A notice to a Guarantor w i l l be deemed complete t w o ( 2 ) days after being placed in the United States M a i l , posta
p r e p a i d , addressed to the Guarantor at the address indicated after the Guarantor's signature.
The liability of each Guarantor is unlimited as to amount unless a limitation is indicated immediately in advance
Guarantor's signature, whereupon the guarantee as to that Guarantor is limited to the indicated amount.

The Borrower hereinafter referred to is .....RITE-WAY. CONCRETE. FORMING. INC
, a n d if more th
one Borrower is indicated, the reference " B o r r o w e r " in this agreement is joint a n d several.
I N WITNESS WHEREOF a n d by authority duly vested, the undersigned have caused this agreement to be executed
of this
I
day of
JUNE
, 19.17.
GUARANTORS:
Limit:

Limit:

fiJ^.M...W^. jyflj£±=iuL
Guarantor
Address:

Guarantor

56M..S.0.UTH...45.4Q..HESX.
CATT

T ATT-C

mn?\T

TTITIATT

Address:

AFFIDAVIT OF MAILING
STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )

ss.

PAUL D. VEASY, being duly sworn, says:
That he Is employed in the office of Biele, Haslam &
Hatch, P.O. attorneys for Peititioner, Valley Bank and Trust
Company.
That he mailed four (4) true and accurate copies of the
Brief of Petitioner upon the parties to the within described
action by placing a true and correct copy thereof in an envelope
addressed to:
K.K. Mclff, Esq.
JACKSON, McIFF & MOWER
Attorneys for Respondents
151 North Main Street
Richfield, Utah 84701
Dwight L. King, Esq.
Attorney for Draper Bank
and Trust
2121 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115

Arthur H. Nielsen, Esq.
Richard Hincks, Esq.
NIELSEN & SENIOR
Attorneys for Jacobsen-Robbins
Construction Company
Beneficial Life Tower
36 South State
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Arthur F. Sandack
Attorney for Tracy Jones
370 East Fifth South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

and by mailing the same with the United States Post Office, first
class, postage prepaid, on the 3o> day of September, 1987.
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SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this f^cAiay of
September, 1987.

My Commission E x p i r e s :

^%?^<£

CJ

C&>tv^Z<rfs

